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The effortless ease of everyday vision seems to conflict with laboratory findings on 
the limited capacity of visual attention.   It now appears that naturalistic stimuli 
escape the stringent limitations of attention that apply to seemingly far simpler 
stimuli.  This astonishing result will oblige us to rethink the nature of visual 
attention and its limited capacity. 
 
 
Everyday vision differs in many ways from what is commonly studied in vision 
laboratories.  For one, the complex natural scenes that inundate everyday vision are far 
cry from the meagre fare of geometric primitives (letters, gratings, etc.) served in most 
laboratories.  For another, the stimuli of everyday vision are rarely as repetitious as those 
used in the laboratory, raising the spectre of narrow skills more highly practised than 
their everyday counterparts.  The list of differences lengthens further when we consider 
dynamic aspects of vision, integration with eye movements, and so forth.   These are 
sobering thoughts for anyone hoping to understand vision in the real world, for it means 
that laboratory findings will not necessarily generalise to the domain of ultimate interest. 
 
Li, Van Rullen, and colleagues [1] now report a particularly dramatic failure to generalise 
from simple to naturalistic stimuli.  Their key finding is that observers categorise the gist 
of natural scenes (e.g., does it contain an animal/vehicle?) even though they cannot, 
under otherwise identical conditions, distinguish simple geometric shapes.  Thus it would 
appear that natural scenes are processed more efficiently, and with less call on attentional 
resources, than simple geometric shapes.   Before accepting this startling conclusion, one 
will wish to take a closer look at the details.  Li and colleagues flash natural scenes 
briefly in the visual periphery, followed by a custom-made stochastic mask to limit visual 
persistence.   The effective presentation time (= 80ms) falls in the ‘ultra-rapid 
categorisation’ range described by Thorpe and others [2-4].  With full attention, observers 
categorise approximately 3 out of 4 of scenes correctly, that is to say, they correctly 
distinguish scenes with and without animals/vehicles in about 75% of all trials (Fig. 1A).   
The same level of performance is obtained for discriminating the simple geometric 
shapes that serve as a comparison (rotated Ts or Ls, two-coloured disks, Fig. 1BC), 
although presentation times need to be longer, hinting that this may not be so ‘simple’ 
after all. 
 
Superiority of natural scenes 
 
A yawning gulf separates natural scenes and geometric shapes, however, when the 
observer’s attention is coaxed away from either.   For natural images continue to be 
categorised with the same success rate even in the ‘near absence’ of attention, whereas 
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the discrimination of geometric shapes collapses to chance level.  The startling robustness 
of natural image processing is especially impressive in view of the demonstrable 
effectiveness of the attentional coaxing [5].     Specifically, observers focussed attention 
as much as possible on a visual search task near the centre of gaze, while reporting 
independently on both the central search and the peripheral categorisation/discrimination.  
To verify this lopsided distribution of attention, central performance was compared 
against a baseline of performing the central search alone (i.e., ignoring the periphery) and 
no significant difference was found.   Any straying of attention would, of course, have 
been reflected in a loss of central performance.   In addition, attention was engaged for an 
extended interval, starting well before and ending well after the peripheral stimulation, so 
that attention could not have ‘swerved’ to the periphery either before or after the central 
search. 
 
Why should natural scenes be more readily distinguishable than geometric shapes?   In 
fact, there are previous indications that natural scenes may trigger a more profound 
perceptual and neural response than plain geometric shapes.   Mack and Rock [6] 
investigated whether observers are aware of highly visible but entirely unexpected stimuli 
when their attention focuses elsewhere, a closely related situation the one under 
discussion.   They observed a dramatic failure of awareness with unexpected geometric 
shape (25% to 80% ‘blindness’ for shapes of various sorts), but virtually complete 
awareness with natural scenes (including faces).  In fact, no observer failed to notice the 
unexpected appearance of a natural scene, and most gave fairly accurate descriptions of 
its contents, in stark contrast to geometric shapes.  The underlying reason for this 
heightened sensitivity to natural scenes may be the nature the neural code for visual 
information.  In area V1 of macaque, natural stimulation increases sparseness and 
intensity of neuronal responses, coupling intense bursts with lower spiking activity 
overall and thus increasing information per spike and efficiency per neurone [7,8].  
Information transmission by V1 neurones (median values of bits/sec and bits/spike) 
varies with stimulus type and may be substantially higher for natural scenes than for 
geometric stimuli such as gratings [8,9].   The informative components of natural scenes 
are sparsely distributed in space and time [10] and the neural code is thought to take 
advantage of this fact.  If so, the neural representation of natural scenes will be more 
intense and more intermittent than that of other stimuli that appear ‘simple’ to us.  In 
short, natural scenes may be intrinsically superior stimuli to the ‘simple’ geometric 
shapes commonly used in vision research. 
 
Vision without attention 
 
In addition to the possible special status of natural scenes, the present results also bear on 
visual capabilities in the ‘near absence’ of attention.   Trained psychophysical observers 
are aware of salient stimuli ‘outside the focus’ of attention and discriminate some of their 
attributes (e.g., contrast, colour, orientation, …), although more complex attributes 
remain indistinguishable (e.g., rotated Ts and Ls, colouring of two-coloured 
disks)[11,12].   Prior familiarity with flashed, masked display turns out to be important to 
these findings [13,14].  In particular, vision ‘outside the focus’ of attention is observed 
with ‘expert’ but not with ‘novice’ observers (to both groups, the specific displays in 
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question are novel, but ‘experts’ benefit from prior experience with other displays).  
Importantly, Li and colleagues [1] show that their results are not due to prior familiarity 
or training.  Firstly, categorisation in the ‘near absence’ of attention occurs also for 
unfamiliar scenes, which observers have not seen during training.  Secondly, observers 
can alternate between categorising animals and categorising vehicles without adverse 
effects on performance, suggesting that categorisation extends even to unfamiliar 
categories (Fig. 1A).  Finally, Li and colleagues show that the discrepancy between 
natural scenes and geometric shapes persists even after equal training on each stimulus 
type. 
 
In perceptual research,  ‘absence’ of attention remains somewhat controversial with no 
operational definition universally agreed.   One school of thought relies on the 
performance effects of dividing attention (not necessarily equally) between two 
conflicting tasks [15].  As one task receives more attention, the other task necessarily 
receives less, causing the respective performance levels to move in opposite directions. 
When one task is performed at chance, one may infer ‘absence’ of attention (or ‘near 
absence’, given the uncertainty of performance measures).   Another school of thought 
holds that some attention is allocated involuntarily [16,17].  In this view, it may not 
possible to ignore (i.e., leave entirely unattended) a stimulus as its mere presence may 
‘capture’ attention.  To account for the results of Li and colleagues, adherents of this 
view might suppose that natural scenes ‘capture’ more attention than geometric shapes.   
However, the central search was performed equally with both types of peripheral stimuli, 
providing no evidence that differential ‘capture’ detracted differentially from the central 
search.  Accordingly, a ‘captured’ attention account would not be consistent with a 
limited capacity of visual attention. 
 
Neural theory of attention 
 
From a neural point of view, the notion of ‘unattended’ stimuli is less problematic.  The 
dominant neural theory views attention as a dynamic state of activity in a hierarchy of 
cortical and possibly sub-cortical visual areas [18,19].   In this view, the activity pattern is 
shaped by visual input signals, by competitive interactions within the hierarchy, and by 
‘bias’ signals from higher areas.   The pattern that emerges may comprise multiple 
winning (‘salient’) objects, all of which become available to awareness, short-term 
memory, voluntary reporting, and so on.  Objects that gained saliency from ‘bias’ signals 
would be considered ‘attended’ in the perceptual terminology, whereas objects benefiting 
exclusively from bottom-up interactions would be considered ‘unattended’.   It follows 
that conscious vision ‘outside the focus’ of attention should embrace only the most 
competitive stimuli in the field of view.   In the paradigm of Li and colleagues [1], 
observers would have been aware of the single peripheral stimulus due to its competitive 
nature.  It may be worth pointing out that this awareness should not extend to multiple 
peripheral stimuli, where the competitive advantage should be lost.   In other words, it 
should not be possible to search an entire array of natural scenes without focussed 
attention.   Rather, visual search with natural scenes should still be ‘serial’ and search 





For more than twenty years, the effortless ease of everyday vision has perched uneasily 
next to some cherished laboratory findings on visual capacity limitations (e.g., the 
ponderous pace of serial visual search).   To resolve this paradox, it has even been 
suggested that our experience of a rich visual world in front of our eyes is a ‘grand 
illusion’ sustained by memory [20].   On a less grand but still helpful scale, visual 
capacity was found to be more commodious than at first apparent, thanks to bottom-up 
interactions mediating conscious access ‘outside the focus’ of attention [11-14].   For 
about the same time, we have known that observers process natural scenes extremely 
rapidly, at least to the point of recognising ‘gist’ [2-4].  Li, Van Rullen, and colleagues 
have now gone even further by demonstrating that natural scenes escape some of the 
stringent capacity limitations that pertain to geometric shapes [1].   If visual capacity is 
even more commodious for natural scenes, this may finally reconcile visual 
psychophysics with our experience of everyday vision.   Of course, this reconciliation 
would oblige us to revisit many results on capacity limitations previously obtained with 
geometric shapes.    In short, everyone working on visual attention and capacity 
limitations ought to be grateful to Li, Van Rullen, and colleagues for having well and 
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Natural scenes and geometric shapes, the two types of  stimuli used by Li, Van Rullen, 
and colleagues [1].  Both types of stimuli were presented briefly in the visual periphery 
and were followed by a mask to limit visual persistence.  Observers focussed attention on 
a demanding task near the centre of gaze, so that any awareness of the peripheral stimuli 
arose in the ‘near absence’ of attention.   Surprisingly, observers categorised natural 
scenes successfully, but fared dismally on discriminating geometric shapes.   A. Natural 
scenes with animals, vehicles, and neither.  Observers categorised scenes as with or 
without animals, or as with or without vehicles.  B.  Rotated Ts and Ls.  Observers tried 
to report letter identity (T or L).  C.  Two-coloured disks.  Observers attempted to report 
colour order (red-green or green-red). 
 
 
